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Systemic Methodology for Cyber Offense and Defense 
C. Ariel Pinto and Matthew Zurasky 





Abstract: This paper describes a systemic method towards standardization of a cyber weapon effectiveness and 
effectiveness prediction process to promote consistency and improve cyber weapon system evaluation accuracy – for both 
offensive and defensive postures. The approach included theoretical examination of existing effectiveness prediction 
processes for kinetic and directed energy weapons, complemented with technical and social aspects of cyber realm. The 
examination highlighted several paradigm-shifts needed to transition from purely kinetic-based processes and transition 
into the realm of combined kinetic and cyber weapons. Components of the new method for cyber weapons are cyber 
payload assessment, effects identification, and target assessment. The ultimate outcome of method is the ‘Probability of 
Kill’ for a cyber weapon paired with a threat and within a given situation. This probability is a function of factors such as 
intelligence gathered on the latency of information, access points, hardware and software configurations, accuracy and 
completeness of network map, understanding of operations tempo; likelihood that vulnerabilities being exploited are 
patched and IT’s ability to detect and respond to the delivery of the cyber payload; and probability that the payload will 
achieve the desired mission effects. Aside from the use of this method for offensive purposes, it can also be mirrored as 
cyber defense and can serve as basis for developing cyber defense strategies, such as focused counter intelligence on 
access points, hardware and software configurations, and network map and architecture, comprehensive patching to 
assure most current and complete patches are deployed, and well trained and equipped IT with ability to detect and 
respond to cyber payloads. 
 
Keyword: Systemic; Systematic; Offense; Defense; Risk; Effectiveness 
1. Background 
Offensive cyber operations (OCO) have been portrayed as an adjunct to conventional weapons and that 
predictable time and effect will be needed if cyber weapons are to be used as a military weapon (The 
Economist, 2010). Cyber weapons have also been described to impact warfare more than ordnance (United 
Press International, 2014). Combatant commanders and mission planners rely upon validated weapon and 
target information to determine the probability of success for mission scenarios by matching kinetic weapons 
to targets. Particularly, the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals (JMEMs) provide damage probabilities for 
specific weapons and threats, physical and functional characteristics of munitions and weapon systems, threat 
vulnerability, obscuration on weapon effectiveness, and analytical techniques and procedures for assessing 
munitions effectiveness (U.S. Army Material Systems Analysis Activity, 2016). JMEMs allow a standardized 
comparison of weapon effectiveness across all three service communities – the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This 
provides combatant commanders a necessary capability - to determine the best combination of weapon 
ordnance and tactics to attack and render enemy systems and structures inoperable. These combatant 
commanders will not utilize cyber warfare without knowing the effects it will produce or the potential 
collateral damage that may occur. Hence, a similar capability for OCO is deemed necessary or the United 
States military will cede this aspect of warfare to adversarial parties. Plans to enable the U.S. military to 
conduct a “combined arms campaign across all domains – land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace” makes it 
clear that there has to be shift from strictly using kinetic weapons to one that combines with cyber weapons 
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2012).  Similar attempts have been ongoing in other parts of DoD, e.g., Air Force 
CyberWorkx which tries to leverage Functional Mission Analysis (FMA)  to effectively transition the 
communication mission to the cyber mission and develop specialized skill sets required for the Air Force’s 
Mission Defense Team operations (Collins, Chiaramonte, & McMinn, 2017).  
2. Current Assessment of Kinetic Weapons 
The process established to assess kinetic weapons allows an analyst to assess the physical interactions 
between ordnance and the threat and to determine if the resulting damage is sufficient to negate the threat’s 
mission. The current basic process to assess kinetic weapons can be summarized in three phases: 1) threat 
assessment, 2) weapons characterization, and 3) damage definition. 
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2.1 Threat assessment 
Once a threat system is identified, intelligence is collected on the threat to identify its critical system elements. 
A schematic model is created of the physical interconnectivities of components and, if appropriate, the 
significant crew members of the threat system. This model is created using combinations of tools like Fault 
Trees and Failure Modes and Events Analysis (FMEA). Once a desired damage level is associated with the 
threat, a complementary mirror model of failures for the system components is developed to indicate which 
components are relevant to affect the intended damage. Component vulnerabilities are estimated based on 
test data, computational physics hydrocode analyses, or engineering level analyses and may include use of 
penetration equations and specialized algorithms, e.g., Jacobs-Roslund equation for explosive detonation 
(Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division, 2014). 
2.2 Weapons characterization 
Characterizing weapons is done using standard data collection methods appropriate to weapons’ effects on 
the threat system and environments. Threat assessment information from the previous phase is used together 
with information specific to weapons, e.g., fragmentation data is collected for fragment masses, shape, 
velocities, and material, and penetration data is collected for projectiles and shaped charge devices. 
Engineering-level simulation codes may be utilized to determine the expected engagement geometry with the 
threat system. 
2.3 Damage definition 
An analyst can pair the threat with a weapon and perform an effectiveness estimate. This estimate provides a 
probability of damage given a hit on the threat and is dependent upon the munition characteristics, the threat 
vulnerability, the damage definition criteria, the velocity and orientation at impact. Examples of damage 
definitions is shown in Table 1 (adapted from Driels M. R., 2013). 
Table 1: Examples of damage definitions 
Target Type Damage Definitions 
Land Vehicles K – catastrophic kill (not repairable); M0 – mobility kill (cannot move, immediately; M40 – 
mobility kill (cannot move within 40 minutes); F – firepower kill (cannot fire) 
Parked Aircraft PTO – repairs requiring at least 5 minutes; PTO4 – repairs requiring at least 4 hours; PTO24 – 
repairs requiring at least 24 hours 
Personnel (standing) Defense (prevent) within 30 seconds; Assault (prevent) within 30 seconds; Assault (prevent) 
within 5 minutes; Supply (prevent) within 12 hours 
 
Eventually, the effectiveness of a weapon is defined as the Probability of Kill (PK) and is the function of several 
probabilities, such that 
 
Pk  =  f (Ptrk , Peng , Pho , Pdisc , Ps , Pmsl , Ph , Pd|h , Pk|d) 
 
Where 
 Ptrk is the probability that the target is acquired and tracked 
 Peng is the probability that the target is engageable (within the weapon system performance envelope) 
 Pho is the probability that handover occurs between the search sensor and the fire control sensor 
 Pdisc is the probability that the weapon system can discriminate the target from decoys or clutter 
 Ps is the probability that the platform or overall system (excluding weapons itself) performs reliably 
 Pmsl is the probability that the weapon will perform reliably, including propulsion, guidance, and fuzing 
functions 
 Ph is the probability of the weapon hitting the target 
 Pd|h is the probability of damage to the target given a hit 
 Pk|d is the probability of a kill given the damage level 
 
Simulation codes such as Advanced Joint Effectiveness Model and Effectiveness ToolBox are used to calculate 
these terms. Figure 1 illustrates a typical effectiveness equation for a missile intercept event (Zurasky, 2015). 
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Figure 1: Kinetic System Effectiveness Kill Chain 
3. Inherent Differences Between Cyber Weapons and Kinetic Weapons
Weapons can impart damage to threats through physical means such as blast, fragment penetration, and heat. 
For example, a high explosive blast causes injuries in the lungs, gastrointestinal tract, and ears in humans and 
damage in equipment compartments and manned spaces in buildings and vehicles. For laser weapons, the 
concentrated beam of visible or invisible light is converted to heat, increasing the temperature of a material 
and causing weakening and deformations. 
However, cyber weapons interact with threats in a different way, as summarized in Table 2. Cyber weapons act 
on logical rather than physical interconnectivities of components and significant crew members. Cyber 
weapons allow compromise of computers and processors by identifying important data to manipulate, steal, 
or destroy, i.e., affects its Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. Cyber weapon penetration into a system is 
not achieved physically. Instead of exploiting the laws of physics as kinetic weapons do, cyber weapons 
leverage inter-computer protocols and human-in-the-loop to gain access to threat computers. Some cyber 
weapons engage networking and administrative tools to probe and map networks and to conduct lateral 
movements across networks while others manipulate the computer code to alter the output of algorithms.  
Furthermore, cyber weapons do not come with an explosive charge. Instead, physical and logical damage must 
be created by the targeted system to itself through stopping or altering ongoing processes (Rid and McBurney, 
2012). The existing definitions for mobility damage and firepower damage still apply to cyber weapons for 
those effects that cause physical damage. On the other hand, not all cyber weapons may be capable or 
designed to directly contribute to Crew damages. 
Table 2: Summarized differences of kinetic and cyber weapons 
Kinetic weapons Cyber weapons 
Threat assessment by… physical interconnectivities of 
components and significant crew 
members 
Logical interconnectivities of components and 
significant crew members 
Target systems penetration 
using… 
laws of physics inter-computer protocols, processes, and 
procedures; system design and architecture; 
human-in-the-loop; social engineering 
Latency Immediate From immediate to indeterminate 
Damage caused by… laws of physics; physical means 
such as blast, fragment 
penetration, and heat effects 
manipulation of software and information; 
targeted system to itself through stopping or 
altering ongoing processes 
Damage persistence... Various Various 
Types of damage… Direct damage to mobility, 
firepower, and crew 
Direct & indirect damage to mobility, and 
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4. Paradigm Shift to Cyber Weapons Assessment 
As in the case for kinetic weapons, the objectives of a cyber weapon effectiveness and effectiveness prediction 
process are to promote consistency and improve weapon system evaluation accuracy across DoD. Without a 
proper assessment and prediction process, commanders will remain reluctant to employ cyber weapons.  
 
Consistency is implemented through a common set of definitions and assumptions that are used by each of 
the Services to produce weapon system performance estimates. This commonality ensures that significant 
differences, if any, are attributable to the weapon system and threat characteristics rather than the methods 
employed by the individual Services. Also, standardization facilitates a common interpretation and meaningful 
comparison of weapon system performance. Thus, the predictions delivered by a cyber effectiveness analysis 
are likely to be accepted by the warfighting community. 
 
Given the ever expanding and emerging cyber realm, and hence also the capabilities of cyber weapons, the 
effectiveness and effectiveness prediction methodology must be robust enough to be tailored to suit each 
analysis. That means there must be some common structure that gives the analyst leeway to develop 
assessments against threats and for damage effects not yet encountered. 
 
For timely acceptance across the Services, a cyber effectiveness methodology must have some parallelisms 
with that for the more established kinetic weapons. However, the emerging nature of the cyber realm would 
necessitate a precursory phase of constant survey of potential cyber effects. Hence, a cyber effectiveness 
methodology may include the following phases, as shown in Figure 2: Identification and definition of cyber 
damage effects, Cyber threat assessment, Cyber weapon characterization, and Cyber effectiveness estimate 
generation. 
 
Figure 2: Proposed cyber effectiveness methodology 
4.1 Identification and definition of Cyber damage effects 
The first element of the common structure is an updated and common set of damage criteria. In some cases, a 
cyber weapon may enact effects that cause physical damage like a kinetic weapon not possible in the recent 
past. For example, a new asymmetrically discovered Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) vulnerability (i.e., 
unpublished Zero-Day Vulnerability) may allow a cyber weapon that causes a servo controller to turn off and 
induce the same failures to a flight system as those caused by a penetrating projectile damaging the same 
servo controller. However, once this vulnerability becomes symmetrically known, then effectiveness may be 
reduced using patches deployed to affected PLC’s. This and other types of added variation in cyber effects 
makes the prediction of cyber weapon effectiveness problematic. The outcomes of some of these effects do 
not directly correspond to existing kinetic weapon damage definitions. Cyber-specific damage effects may 
include those listed in Table 3. 
 
These and other possible types of effects that may emerge need to have quantifiable metrics associated with 
them to be usable in the field. Two important metrics both based on time are how rapid the effect sets in 
(latency), and the associated duration period (persistence), as shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Cyber effects, brief description, and sample metricification (adapted from Zurasky, 2017) 
Cyber damage Brief description Sample metrics 
Unavailability of 
network resources 
Computer, communication, or network resources are 
made unavailable to intended users by temporarily or 
indefinitely disrupting services of a host connected to 
the Internet (e.g., similar effect to Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attack) 
Latency: immediate 
Persistence: 5 minutes (DoS), four 




false or incorrect information is spread intentionally to 
affect down-stream processes and procedures 
Latency: gradual 
Persistence: 5 minutes (MisI), four 
hours (MisI4), or 24 hours (MisI24) 
Data Modification data is inserted, deleted, or altered in a manner that is 
intended to appear genuine to the user to affect down-
stream processes and procedures 
Latency: immediate to gradual 
Persistence: 5 minutes (DMod), four 
hours (DMod 4), or 24 hours (DMod 
24) 
Data Repudiation data or information is made to appear to be invalid or 
misleading to affect down-stream processes and 
procedures 
Latency: immediate 
Persistence: 5 minutes (DRep), four 
hours (DRep 4), or 24 hours (DRep 
24) 
Spoofing an attempt to masquerade as someone else Latency: immediate 
Persistence: indeterminate 
4.2 Cyber Threat Assessment 
Like kinetic weapon assessments, a multi-phase cyber effectiveness threat vulnerability assessment must 
include the following: (1) threat selection, (2) threat modeling, and (3) identification of component 
vulnerabilities. 
4.2.1 threat selection 
In threat selection, the analyst will identify the threat and begin to gather baseline information. This will 
include a brief description of the threat, relevant photos or schematic drawings, top level failure analysis logic 
trees, and a list of assumptions pertinent to the analysis.  
4.2.2 threat modeling 
In threat modeling, the analyst will begin to develop a threat model to include a detailed description of the 
threat, a network model (if appropriate), and a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA). For a cyber 
evaluation, the physical components of the threat are not significant. Instead, the software code and its 
functional elements are the items to be evaluated. The system boundaries are important when developing the 
network model. The key aspect of threat modeling is to identify the critical functional elements and the 
conditions that need to be altered in order to change the state of the threat system and achieve the desired 
effect. For example, the FMEA can identify a servo controller as a single point failure node. A well-designed 
cyber weapon can then alter the state of the servo causing loss of system control. 
4.2.3 vulnerability assessment 
In vulnerability assessment, the analyst will identify the vulnerability of the identified critical cyber 
components, including how it can be exploited, i.e., access, trigger, and impact. The vulnerability can be 
considered as an element (flaw or designed) in the software or environment that can be exploited. These 
elements (both flaws and designed) becomes vulnerabilities when exploitation path are identified. Otherwise, 
these may simply be inert elements. Vulnerabilities can exist in the threat system design, within installed 
software, within its network configuration, or be associated with its business operations. Some known 
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Table 4: Cases of exploited vulnerabilities 




hardcoded passwords embedded in the 
firmware that allow attackers gain 
complete access  
• Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems 
(SCADA) provided by Siemens, TURCK, etc. were 
vulnerable (TURCK CVE, 2012) 
Insecure 
Authentication and 
File Uploading  
security issues arising from inability of 
the systems to implement granular 
control through proper authentication 
and authorization checks 
• Global Positioning System (GPS) Satellite 
Communication (SATCOM) systems provided by 
Harris, Cobham, JRC, Iridium and Hughes were 
vulnerable (Warner, et al., 2012) 
Remote Code 
Execution  
security issues such as buffer 
overflows, memory corruption, 
privilege escalations, dangling pointers 
in operating system components, 
browsers, critical systems such as 
ICS/SCADA, routers, other software 
such as Microsoft Office, Adobe 
Reader, Java, etc. 
• SCADA systems provided by ICONICS GENESIS32, 
BizViz, IntegraXor, Sielco Sistemi, etc. were 
vulnerable to Buffer Overflows (InfoSec, 2011) 
• XMLDOM Zero-day vulnerability was exploited to 
attack U.S. Veterans of Foreign Wars’ website 
(Gonsalves, 2014)  
• Operation Pawn Storm uses vulnerabilities in MS 
office files to target U.S. military officials (Paganini, 
2014) 
SQL Injections  weaknesses in web applications that 
allow attackers’ queries to be executed 
directly in the backend database 
• Royal Navy website hacked using SQL Injection 
(BBC News, 2010)  
• U.S. Army website hacked using SQL Injection 




undocumented and insecure protocols 
allow hijacking and spoofing of 
communication channels 
Common Channel Signaling System 7 (CCSS7) in the 
US or Common Channel Interoffice Signaling 7 
(CCIS7) in the UK,(The Guardian, 2016) 
• Possible attacks to spoof GPS communication to 
control U.S. drones (Schwartz, 2011) 
 
All the various cyber components must be listed with their associated vulnerabilities. This will provide the 
cyber weapon designer with a complete description – equivalent to the kinetic weapon Threat Geometry 
Model – against which to choose the most appropriate available cyber capability to cause damage. 
4.3 Cyber weapon characterization 
A cyber weapon is a software capability by which an attacker exploits a vulnerability within a target system to 
cause damage. None of the kinetic weapon characteristics apply (e.g., warhead fragmentation and blast 
overpressure data, guidance methods, fuse functions, and reliability). Instead, new characteristics will have to 
be developed. These should be categorized according to cyber weapon’s functional responsibilities of 
Reconnaissance, Lateral Movement, Payload Deployment. 
4.3.1 Cyber Reconnaissance 
In order to penetrate and exploit an adversarial network, some aspect of the cyber weapon will require 
networking reconnaissance tools to map out the threat network, to probe potential avenues, and to monitor 
activities. The weapon will be required to locate the desired target components and identify ways to get to 
them, i.e., cyber access to exploit vulnerabilities. By utilizing host and port scan applications to map out the 
network resources, the weapon will develop an inventory of relevant target components. The reconnaissance 
characterization should include descriptions of its function and the operational environment in which it 
operates. Lightcyber (2016) notes that 99% of reconnaissance and lateral movement threats originated from 
legitimate applications and only 1% originated from malware. Some of the more popular networking and 
hacking reconnaissance tools include Angry IP Scanner, PingInfoView, and Nmap.  
4.3.2 Lateral movement 
Once the target system has been successfully penetrated, the cyber weapon may have to extend across the 
network to the vulnerable component. It will do so by using lateral movement applications. Lateral movement 
facilitates the attacker to maintain presence in the network, gain control of the administrative privileges, and 
move to the key vulnerable components. The lateral movement characterization should include descriptions of 
its function and the operational environment in which it operates. Some of the more popular administrative 
tools for lateral movement include SecureCRT, Putty, and BeyondExec Remote Service. 
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In addition, remote desktop tools are used to move laterally within a network and to remotely control 
elements. Legitimate Information Technology administrators use them to manage networks, but cyber 
weapons can use them to control elements that have been compromised. Some of the more popular remote 
desktop tools for lateral movement are TeamViewer, WinVNC, and Radmin. 
4.3.3 Payload deployment 
In addition to the reconnaissance and lateral movement functions, a cyber weapon may deploy a payload. 
Payload refers to the component of a computer code that executes an activity that is unwanted by the 
targeted system, i.e., to trigger the exploited vulnerability. This does not include the reconnaissance and 
lateral movement code required to get the payload packet to its destination. Some example effects of 
payloads are data exfiltration, manipulation or destruction, interrupted or inconsistent messages, and the 
delivery of spam emails through an infected user's account. The payload characterization should include 
descriptions of its function and the operational environment in which it operates or would remain dormant. 
For example, the characterization should indicate that it exfiltrates data from computers that utilize the 
Windows 10 operating system but will not be active in other variants of Windows OS. 
4.4 Cyber offense effectiveness estimate generation 
The effectiveness estimate of cyber weapons is the point in the process where the analyst predicts the 
outcome of the use of a weapon on a specific threat system in a specified environment, e.g., impact of 
vulnerability exploitation. Determining Probability of Kill (PK) for a kinetic weapon system is often used by 
logisticians to determine weapon load-out and by mission planners to develop tactics. Commanders must have 
confidence in the effectiveness of weapons before using them, and especially important when physical 
damage may not be evident as confirmation. 
 
An effectiveness equation for a typical missile intercept event was illustrated in Figure 2. It was pointed out 
that much of the uncertainty, and the associated probabilities, occur after the engagement begins. Similar kill 
chain models for cyber engagements have been previously developed by Lockheed Martin and Mandiant (now 
FireEye) for an advanced persistent threat (APT) attack (Holmes, 2015). In both there are distinct stages of the 
engagement. The durations of these stages are much longer than the stages of a kinetic engagement. In 
addition, the pre-compromise stage where reconnaissance occurs is actually prior to the engagement start, 
i.e., prior to when the commander wants to engage the cyber weapon. 
 























 PLatent, PAccess, PConfig, PMap, and PTempo are the probabilities based on the intelligence gathered on the 
latency of information, access points, hardware and software configurations, completeness of network 
map, understanding of operations tempo 
 PPatch and PIT are probabilities based on likelihood of that vulnerabilities being exploited are patched 
and IT’s ability to detect and respond to the delivery of the cyber payload 
 PExploit is the probability that the payload will achieve the desired mission effects 
 
Figure 3 shows the resulting cyber effectiveness equation for a path through a hypothetical network (from 
Zurasky, 2017). 
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Figure 3: Cyber effectiveness equation for a hypothetical network 
4.5 Example cyber offense effectiveness generation: Chemical weapons facility 
This section describes an example of how the proposed cyber weapon effectiveness methodology may be 
applied to a hypothetical scenario partly based on the vulnerability of the ABB Power Generation Information 
Manager (PGIM), identified as CVE-2019-18250 (CVE, 2019), and described in Kovacs (2019).  
4.5.1 Phase 1: Identification and definition of cyber damage effects 
In early November of 2019, a chemical weapons facility was identified as a threat and a desired damage effect 
was determined to be a gradual interruption of its operation lasting at least 24 hours by injecting incorrect 
equipment control information, i.e., MisI24 from Table 3. 
4.5.2 Phase 2: Cyber threat assessment: 
After the threat was identified and a desired damage effect was determined, intelligence was gathered 
through various ways. Significant information is summarized as follows: 
 The facility uses ABB Power Generation Information Manager (PGIM) 800xA systems version 5.x, a 
distributed, open client/server architecture for collecting, archiving and consolidating data from 
various equipment 
 Excel add-ins are used to performs basic arithmetic functions (e.g., water/steam chart calculations) 
used by machine operators, technicians, and maintenance crew 
 The administrators’ Windows credentials are the same as the ones for PGIM 
4.5.3 Cyber weapon characterization 
After threat assessment, cyber reconnaissance was conducted, and the following significant information was 
gathered: 
 There is only one information network for the entire facility 
 Encryption method used in transmitting information is outdated 
 The network is behind a weak firewall 
 Access into the network from the outside is through VPN, but is not strictly enforced 
 The facility always employs two IT personnel using outdated scanning methods 
 
A zero-day vulnerability (ZDV) for all versions of ABB Power Generation Information Manager (PGIM) was 
identified which makes a network using PGIM vulnerable to authentication bypass, which may allow an 
attacker to remotely bypass authentication and extract credentials from the affected device. Being a ZDV, this 
vulnerability is not known to the public and has no known patch. Because threat assessment showed that the 
facility’s PGIM credentials are the same as the Windows domain administrator credentials, it was determined 
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A team of coders then developed and tested an exploit code on ABB 800xA systems version 5.x which bypasses 
authentication and default security architecture to reveal usernames and passwords in the system. 
4.5.4 Cyber effectiveness estimate generation 
For simple illustrative purpose, the probabilities may be expertly judged to be low (0.01), moderate (0.05), and 
high (0.1) based on the preceding phases. These values are summarized in Table 5.  
Table 5: Cyber effectiveness estimates for chemical weapons facility example 
PLatent High; Information is very current 0.1 
PAccess,  High; VPN not strictly enforced 0.1 
PConfig,  High; well documented, based on manufacturer setting; single network 0.1 
PMap,  High; well documented; weak firewall 0.1 
PTempo High 0.1 
PPatch  High; no patch exists 0.1 
PIT Moderate; only two personnel are employed using outdates scanning methods 0.05 
PExploit High; exploit code is tested and verified 0.1 
 
The function of Pk = f(*) used is a modified version proposed by Zurasky (2017) where the 8-th root is obtained 






Hence, from Table 5, the resulting Pk =  
5. Cyber defense effectiveness estimate generation 
Anti-goal approach has been proposed as one way to create failure scenarios from a top-down approach (e.g., 
Pinto, Tolk, and Landaeta, 2010), and can be appropriately used to transform the cyber offense effectiveness 
equation into a cyber defence effectiveness equation. That is, if cyber offensive mean increasing the likelihood 
of cyber weapon effectiveness, maximizing Pk, then cyber defence means maximizing (-Pk), or equivalently, 






















 Broadly, this equation can be the basis for developing cyber defense strategies, such as 
 Focused counterintelligence on access points, hardware and software configurations, and network 
map and architecture to keep adversary’s PLatent, PAccess, PConfig, PMap, and PTempo at their minima 
 Comprehensive patching to assure most current and complete patches are deployed to minimize PPatch, 
 Well trained and equipped IT with ability to detect and respond to cyber payloads to minimize PIT  
5.1 Example cyber defense effectiveness generation: Chemical weapons facility 
This section briefly describes how the proposed cyber weapons effectiveness methodology may be applied for 
defensive purpose, through the extension of the earlier chemical weapons facility scenario. 
 
By late November 2019, the vulnerability of PGIM was revealed publicly by Kovacs (2019). As a response, the 
chemical weapons facility applied the following cyber defense strategies as suggested by Bodforss (2019) and 
US-CERT (2019). These strategies are summarized in the following: 
 Segmenting the chemical production network into several networks instead of a single network for the 
entire facility and layered security architecture was implemented to slow down lateral movement into 
these networks 
 More controlled access to PGIM using stronger firewall and stricter implementation of VPN for access 
outside of the network 
 Windows domain user credentials were removed from PGIM 
 IT personnel were increased and more advanced intrusion scanning, and detection technologies were 
implemented, and various profiles of possible exploit codes made public (e.g., GITHUB, 2019) were 
analyzed by IT personnel for faster identification, if intrusion occurs 
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Correspondingly, the resulting effectiveness estimate – both for purpose of offense or defense - can be 
summarized in Table 6. 
Table 6: Cyber effectiveness estimates for chemical weapons facility example (defense) 
PLatent High; Information is very current 0.1 
PAccess,  Low; VPN now strictly enforced; Windows administrators’ credentials removed from PGIM; 
more secure firewall 
0.01 
PConfig,  Low; hardware and software settings not default and unknown to outside 0.01 
PMap,  Moderate; network is segmented, and security is layered 0.05 
PTempo High 0.1 
PPatch  High; no patch exists 0.1 
PIT Low; increased IT personnel and monitoring 0.01 
PExploit Low; exploit code known and can be easily detected 0.01 
 
From Table 6, the resulting Pk = . As expected, cyber defense strategies may result to 
decrease in cyber effectiveness estimate and the proposed cyber weapon effectiveness method was shown to 
be able applicable to both offensive and defensive purposes 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
A cyber weapon effectiveness and effectiveness prediction process was derived from similarities and 
differences between cyber and kinetic weapons, with the objective of promoting consistency and improving 
accuracy of weapon system evaluation across DoD. The four phases of this process are 1) Identification and 
definition of cyber damage effects, 2) Cyber threat assessment, 3) Cyber weapon characterization, and 4) 
Cyber effectiveness estimate generation. Furthermore, cyber defense strategies can be mirrored from this 
same offensive process, e.g., focused counterintelligence, comprehensive patching, and capable IT program.  
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